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A structural econometric investigation of the agency theory of
ﬁnancial structure
We estimate a structural model of ﬁnancing choices in presence of managerial
moral hazard, ﬁnancial distress costs and taxes. In the theoretical model, ﬁrms
with low cost of managerial effort, and high ﬁnancial distress costs and non–debt
tax shields, ﬁnd it optimal to issue equity. Correspondingly the likelihood that a
given ﬁrm issues equity is the probability that its managerial cost of effort is below
an upper bound, reﬂecting its ﬁnancial distress cost and non debt tax shields, as
well as the other deep parameters of the model. Similarly we characterize the
likelihood of issues of debt and convertible bonds. Using maximum likelihood
analysis, weconfrontthistheoreticalmodeltodataonﬁnancingchoicesbyFrench
ﬁrms in 1996. We ﬁnd large costs of ﬁnancial distress, equal on average to 41.2%
of the value of the ﬁrm when it is in distress. We also ﬁnd large agency costs,
equal to 40.26% of the value of the investment project. In contrast, we ﬁnd that
tax shields do not play a signiﬁcant role in the ﬁnancing decision.
JEL codes: G32.1 Introduction
One of the central paradigms in corporate ﬁnance, stemming from the seminal
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963), emphasizes the tax shield value
of debt, and compares it to the potential costs of ﬁnancial distress induced by
leverage.1 A competing paradigm is offered by the agency theory of ﬁnancial
structure, analyzing information asymmetries and conﬂicts of interests between
managers and outside ﬁnanciers, in the line of the seminal works of Jensen and
Meckling (1976),2 emphasizing moral hazard, and Ross (1977), Leland and Pyle
(1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984), emphasizing adverse selection.3 A rich
body of empirical work has shed light on the relevance of these two paradigms.4
Complementing this literature, which has mainly relied on reduced forms regres-
sions, the present paper proposes a structural econometric approach. The goal is
to conduct a direct test of the implications of the theory and to estimate the deep
parameters of the model, thus generating measures of ﬁnancial distress costs and
agency costs.
In the next section we present a simple theoretical model of ﬁnancing choices
with ﬁnancial distress costs, tax shields and moral hazard. Consider a manager,
facing an investment project with positive net present value if he exerts sufﬁcient
effort. Internal cash is available to the ﬁrm to contribute to the ﬁnancing of the
project. But additional outside ﬁnancing must be obtained. The ﬁnancing alter-
natives available include straight debt, convertible debt, and outside equity. Each
of these give claims to the outside investors on the cash ﬂows generated by the
project. These claims cannot be too high, lest they should destroy the incentives
of the manager to exert costly effort, by reducing his stake in the cash ﬂows. In
addition to this moral hazard problem, the model features ﬁnancial distress costs
1This classical tradeoff theory of ﬁnancial structure is presented, for example, in the textbooks
of Brealey and Myers (1991, p 434) and Ross, Westerﬁeld and Jaffe (1988, p 427). Heinkel and
Zechnner (1993) study capital structure adjustment with ﬁnancial distress costs.
2One could in fact trace this line of literature back to Adam Smith, as illustrated by the follow-
ing sentences from the Wealth of Nations (1776), quoted by Jensen and Meckling (1976): “The
directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a copartnery frequently watch over their own.”
3An insightful survey of more recent works in this ﬁeld is presented by Harris and Raviv
(1991).
4See e.g. Miller and Modigliani (1966), Long and Malitz (1985), Mackie–Mason (1990),
Lucas and MacDonald (1990), Titman and Wessels (1988), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Shyam–
Sunder and Myers (1999), and Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1998).
1and corporate taxes. We ﬁnd that, if the cost of ﬁnancial distress, the disutility of
effort, and the amount of outside ﬁnancing needed are too high, the project cannot
be funded, and there is credit rationing. On the other hand, if the cost of effort is
relatively low, the project can be undertaken and ﬁnanced by equity. In interme-
diary situations, where both the cost of effort and the cost of ﬁnancial distress are
signiﬁcant, convertible debt can offer a better ﬁnancing tool than both debt and
equity, and thus enable the project to be undertaken.5
To confront this theoretical model to the data, we rely on a sample of 379
French ﬁrms listed on the Bourse in 1996. This dataset is presented in Section
III. Along with information on balance sheets and income statements, our data
includes information about equity and convertible debts issues, as well as on in-
creases in debt ﬁnancing for these companies. In our sample, 16 ﬁrms issued
equity, 9 issued convertible bonds, 75 issued straight debt, and 279 did not issue
any outside ﬁnancial claim.
In section IV we present our econometric approach. The cost of effort is as-
sumed to differ across ﬁrms. While the manager and the ﬁnancier observe it, for
the econometrician it is a random variable, i.e., an unobservable heterogeneity
component. We estimate the distribution of this cost of effort as well as the other
deep parameters of the model, using maximum likelihood estimation. The idea
underlying our econometric approach is the following. Our theoretical analysis
implies that ﬁrms can rely on equity ﬁnancing only if their cost of effort is lower
than a threshold value, which is a function of the deep parameters of the model
and the observable variables for that ﬁrm. When equity ﬁnancing is thus feasible,
ﬁrms choose to issue equity if this generates less taxes and bankruptcy costs than
other feasible ﬁnancing schemes. Consequently the likelihood that a given ﬁrm
issues equity is the probability that these conditions are met, implying in partic-
ular that its cost of effort be lower than its threshold value. Similarly, we write
the likelihood of convertible bonds and straight debt issues, as well as the likeli-
hood that ﬁrms do not issue any outside ﬁnancial claim. We then search for the
parameter values maximizing the likelihood of the observed ﬁnancial choices.
Section V presents our econometric results. In this preliminary draft, we have
not analyzed the convertible bonds issues. Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial
5Our theoretical analysis of the incentive properties of convertible debt is related to Green
(1984), Harris and Raviv (1985), Stein (1992), Décamps and Faure Grimaud (1997) and Biais and
Casamatta (1998). The main difference with Green (1984), Décamps and Faure Grimaud (1997)
and Biais and Casamatta (1998) is that we focus on managerial effort and not on risk shifting.
Similarly to Stein (1992), we analyze the trade–off between asymmetric information and ﬁnancial
distress costs, but we focus on moral hazard while Stein (1992) considers a signalling model.
2distress costs and agency issues play an important role, while tax considerations
do not. Our estimate of the average cost of ﬁnancial distress: 41.2 % of the value
of the ﬁrm when it is in distress, is rather large. So is our estimate of agency costs,
which we ﬁnd on average equal to 40.26% of the value of the investment project.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that tax shields do not play a signiﬁcant role in the ﬁnancing
decision.
Section VI offers a brief conclusion. Some technical aspects of our analysis
are in Appendices 1 and 2.
2 Theoretical model
2.1 The investment project
For simplicity, we focus on a simple one–period model, with risk–neutral agents.6
Consider a manager–owned ﬁrm. Assume its assets in place pay X with certainty
at the end of the period. Also, debt in place d must be serviced to senior debthold-
ers at the end of the period. We assume that X > d, i.e., the ﬁrm is not currently
in ﬁnancial distress,7 and that the assets in place are currently illiquid, i.e., they
generate X only at the end of the period. In addition to these illiquid assets, the
ﬁrm has cash A. It also faces an investment opportunity, requiring initial invest-
ment I > A. Since assets in place other than A are illiquid, the investment can be
undertaken only if the ﬁrm can raise outside ﬁnancing I − A.
The manager can decide to exert unobservable effort, to enhance the proﬁtabil-
ity of the project, or not to exert effort. The disutility of effort for the manager is e.
Effort improves the distribution of the cash–ﬂow obtained at the end of the period,
in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. If the manager decides to exert
effort, the distribution of the cash ﬂow R is given by the density f(.) with support
[0,T], and c.d.f F(.). If the manager decides not to exert effort, the density of the
cash ﬂow is g(.), with the same support but with a dominated distribution. The
corresponding c.d.f is denoted G(.). Denote Ef(.) the expectation operator with
respect to the density f, and Eg(.) the expectation taken with respect to g.
Assume effort is socially optimal, i.e., Ef(R) − e > Eg(R), and that under
6Our moral hazard model is in the same spirit as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Innes
(1990). Differences between our theoretical model and theirs include our focus on equity, debt
and convertible debt and on bankruptcy costs and taxes.
7Hence there are no issues associated with gambling for resurrection, see Décamps and Faure
Grimaud (1998).
3effort, the project has positive net present value:
Ef(R) − e > ρI,
where ρ is the social discount rate, while without effort it has negative net present
value:
Eg(R) < ρI.
Hence, the issue at stake is wether it is possible to ﬁnance the project while ensur-
ing that the manager will indeed exert effort. For simplicity we hereafter normal-
ize the discount rate ρ to 1.
At the end of the period, corporate income tax at rate τ must be paid. Debt
provides tax shields since interest expenses are tax deductible.
2.2 Financing the project
2.2.1 Equity
One possibility is for the manager to issue equity. In this case, when the project is
undertaken, cash–ﬂow from operations, minus interest expenses equals:
X + R − kd,
where k is the fraction of debt service d corresponding to interest payments. Con-
sequently, taxes equal:
(X + R − kd)(τ),
and the total cash ﬂow to equity holders is:
(X + R − kd)(1 − τ) − (1 − k)d,
which can be rewritten as:
(X + R)(1 − τ) − d + kτd,
i.e., after tax cash ﬂow from unlevered ﬁrm, minus cash ﬂow to debtholders, plus
tax shields from debt.8
8The ﬁrm would beneﬁt from increasing the fraction of the debt service corresponding to in-
terests (k), but we assume that this fraction is exogenous, and reﬂects legal constraints, and thus
cannot be manipulated by the ﬁrm.
4Denoteδ theshareoftheownershipoverthecashﬂowsallocatedtotheoutside
ﬁnancier, i.e. the dilution. At the end of the period outside ﬁnanciers obtain:
δ[(X + R)(1 − τ) − d + kτd],
while the manager obtains:
(1 − δ)[(X + R)(1 − τ) − d + kτd].
2.2.2 Debt ﬁnancing
Alternatively, the manager can issue debt. Denote D the service of the new debt.
kD corresponds to interests payments, while (1−k)D corresponds to reimburse-
ment. We assume that the debt in place d is senior and the new debt D is junior.
Leverage can generate ﬁnancial distress. Financial distress, and the corre-
sponding costs, can arise before the ﬁrm effectively defaults on its debt. For
simplicity, in the present one–period model, we collapse both events (ﬁnancial
distress and default) into a single event, which happens when R + X < D + d,
i.e., when earnings before interests and taxes are not sufﬁcient to service the debt.
In that case, the cost of ﬁnancial distress, borne by the junior debtholders, is as-
sumed to be equal to: c(R+X−d), where c is a constant between 0 and 1. In spite
of our simplifying assumption, it is important to bear in mind that in addition to
direct bankruptcy costs, such as legal fees, c reﬂects indirect, economic costs, re-
lated to the fact that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms must face problems reducing their
value. Examples of such indirect costs are the fact that customers and suppliers
are reluctant to engage in relationships with distressed ﬁrms, that the employees
of such ﬁrms are less encline towards investing in ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital, and
that competitors are likely to engage in predatory price wars to drive the distressed
ﬁrm out of business.9
In this context, when the project is ﬁnanced by debt, at the end of the period
the manager obtains:
Max[0,(R + X)(1 − τ) − (D + d) + τk(D + d)],
i.e., the manager obtains the after tax cash ﬂow from the unlevered ﬁrm, minus the
service of debt, and plus the tax shields from debt. The outside ﬁnancier obtains:
Min[R + X − d,D] − c(R + X − d)1(R < D + d − X),
9The latter concern is emphasized in the Harvard Business School case “MCI communications
Corp., 1983”, which studies issues of convertible bonds. See for example the discussion on page
4 of the Teaching Note by Bruce Greenwald (1986). See also Chevalier (1995).
5where 1(R < D + d − X) is the indicator variable taking the value one when
R < D + d − X, i.e., when the ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress.
2.2.3 Convertible debt
Another possible ﬁnancing scheme is to issue convertible debt. In this case the
outside ﬁnanciers hold debt, promising repayment D, and in addition have the
option to convert this debt into a fraction γ of the equity. The maturity of the
option is at the end of the period, when the cash ﬂow R is realized. The outside
ﬁnanciers exercise this option if the value of the fraction γ of the equity is worth
more than the repayment on the debt, i.e., if:
γ((R + X)(1 − τ) − d + kτd) > D.
Hence, with convertible bonds, the outside ﬁnancier obtains:
Min[R+X−d,Max[D,γ((R+X)(1−τ)−d+kτd)]]−c(R+X−d)1(R < D+d−X),
while the manager obtains:
Max[0,Min[(R+X)(1−τ)−(D+d)+kτ(D+d),(1−γ)((R+X)(1−τ)−d+kτd)]].
Of course, equity is a particular case of convertible bond, for D = 0, while debt
is a particular case for γT > D, i.e., for values of D and γ such that it is never
optimal to convert the bond into equity.
In the present paper, we do not search for optimal contracts which could well
be more general than debt, convertible bonds or equity. Rather, we take a positive
approach, taking as given the contracts or securities actually observed in ﬁnancial
markets. This is because the goal of the present theoretical model is to provide a
framework for our econometric analysis of the existing ﬁnancing tools observed
in the data: equity, debt and convertible bonds.
Issuing securities, such as equity or convertible bonds entails transactions
costs, including the commissions paid to the ﬁnancial intermediaries in charge
of the placement of the securities. Denote: FC the cost incurred in the case of
convertible debt, and FE the cost incurred in the case of equity. The presence of
these ﬁxed costs justiﬁes the reliance of the ﬁrm on one of the three ﬁnancing
alternatives (equity, debt or convertible debt) rather than a mix of the three.10 Be-
cause convertible debt is a more sophisticated product than equity, it is likely to
entail larger commissions, i.e., FC > FE. For simplicity we normalize FE to 0.
10This corresponds to the situation described in the above mentioned Harvard Business School
case: “MCI communications corp., 1983”. See for example the discussion on page 7 of the Teach-
ing Note by Bruce Greenwald (1992).
62.3 The moral hazard problem
2.3.1 Moral hazard with equity
First consider the case of equity ﬁnancing. Since the project has positive net
present value only if effort is undertaken, it can be ﬁnanced with equity, with








i.e., if the manager ﬁnds it in his interest to exert effort. On the other hand, if the
investors anticipate that the manager will exert effort, they are willing to provide
equity ﬁnancing if and only if the following individual rationality constraint holds:
(1 − τ)δEf(R + X −
1 − kτ
1 − τ
d) ≥ I − A.
Hence, the project can be ﬁnanced with equity if and only if there exists δ ∈ [0,1]
such that the two conditions above hold.11
The incentive compatibility condition of the manager can be rewritten as:
δ ≤ 1 −
e
(1 − τ)(Ef(R) − Eg(R))
.
The manager is not willing to work hard if his inside equity claim on the cash ﬂow
of the ﬁrm is too diluted because δ is too large.12 Note that this problem is more





Ef(R + X − σd)(1 − τ)
,
where σ = 1−kτ
1−τ . This inequality means that the investors are willing to ﬁnance
the project only if their claim on the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is large enough that they
11It is straightforward to show that if the incentive compatibility condition of the manager and
the individual rationality condition of the ﬁnancier are consistent, then there exists a value of δ,
satisfying both of these conditions and the individual rationality condition of the manager (for
example set δ to saturate the individual rationality condition of the ﬁnancier). The same remark
also applies to the cases of straight debt and convertible bonds.
12This is the sense in which we interpret the statement by the CEO of MCI (in the HBS case:
“MCI communications corp. 1983”) that too much dilution could undermine the performance of
the ﬁrm.
7can recoup from their initial cash outﬂow. This rewriting of the two conditions
shows that there is a potential conﬂict between them. Yet, if the cost of effort is
not too large, the upper bound on the dilution imposed by the incentive compati-
bility condition of the manager is relatively high, hence it can be consistent with
the participation constraint of the outside ﬁnancier. Consequently, ﬁnancing the
investment with equity is feasible if the cost of effort is not too large, as stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Investment can take place and be ﬁnanced with equity if and only
if the cost of effort of the manager is lower than the following threshold:
eE =





Note that the larger the outside ﬁnancing need (I −A) the lower the threshold
for the cost of effort (eE). This is because if the outside ﬁnancing need is large, a
large amount must be pledged to the outside ﬁnancier, i.e., dilution is large, which
reduces the compensation to the manager, and weakens his incentives.
2.3.2 Moral hazard with debt
Denote ˆ ϕ(D) the difference between the expected cash ﬂow to the manager under
effort and his expected cash ﬂow without effort.
ˆ ϕ(D) = Ef(Max[(R + X)(1 − τ) − (D + d) + kτ(D + d),0])
−Eg(Max[(R + X)(1 − τ) − (D + d) + kτ(D + d),0]).
The incentive compatibility condition of the manager is:
ˆ ϕ(D) ≥ e.




(1 − τ)[(R + X) − σ(D + d)](f(R) − g(R))dR.





8which is decreasing with D. Consistent with intuition, the larger the debt service,
the lower the incentives of the manager to exert effort. Relying on this monotonic-
ity property, the incentive compatibility condition of the manager is equivalent
to:
D ≤ ˆ ϕ
−1(e).
Consistent with the debt–overhang effect analyzed by Myers (1977), the manager
is not willing to exert effort if the service of debt is too large.
Denoteϕ(D)theexpectedcashﬂowearnedbythedebt–holdersifthepromised
repayment is D and if the manager exerts effort, i.e.,
ϕ(D) = Ef(Min[R + X − d,D] − c(R + X − d)1(R < D + d − X)).
The participation constraint of the outside ﬁnancier holds iff:
ϕ(D) ≥ I − A.
Similarly to ˆ ϕ, it can be shown that, for the relevant values of D, ϕ(D) is increas-
ing in D. This has a natural interpretation: the larger the amount D promised to
the debt holders, the larger their expected cash–ﬂow (provided the manager exerts




i.e., the ﬁnancier is willing to fund the project only if he is promised a sufﬁciently
large repayment.
Consequently, the project can be undertaken while being funded by debt if
there exists a value of D ∈ [0,T] sufﬁciently low to incentivize the manager to
exert effort, and at the same time sufﬁciently large to compensate the investors.
Similarly to the case of equity, this is possible if and only if the cost of effort is
not too large, as stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 Investment can take place and be ﬁnanced with debt if and only
the cost of effort of the manager is lower than the following threshold:
eD = ˆ ϕ(ϕ
−1(I − A)).
92.3.3 Moral hazard with convertible debt
Denote ˆ ψ(γ,D) the difference between the expected cash ﬂow to the manager
under effort and his expected cash ﬂow without effort.
ˆ ψ(γ,D) = Ef(Max[0,Min[(R + X)(1 − τ) − (D + d) + kτ(D + d),
(1 − γ)((R + X)(1 − τ) − d + kτd)]])
−Eg(Max[0,Min[(R + X)(1 − τ) − (D + d) + kτ(D + d),
(1 − γ)((R + X)(1 − τ) − d + kτd)]]).
The incentive compatibility condition of the manager is:
ˆ ψ(γ,D) ≥ e.
It can easily be shown that ˆ ψ(γ,D) is decreasing in γ. This has a natural in-
terpretation: the larger the dilution promised to the bond–holders the lower the
incentives of the manager to exert effort. Consequently, the incentive compatibil-
ity condition of the manager is equivalent to:




γ denotes the inverse of ˆ ψ with respect to γ. Similarly to the equity
ﬁnancing case, dilution must not be too large, lest it should destroy the incentives
of the manager to exert efffort.
Denote ψ(γ,D) the expected cash ﬂow earned by the debt–holders if the
promised repayment is D, the conversion rate is γ, and the manager exerts ef-
fort, i.e.,
ψ(γ,D) = Ef(Min[R + X − d,Max[D,γ((R + X)(1 − τ) − d + kτd)]]
−c(R + X − d)1(R < D + d − X),).
The participation constraint of the outside ﬁnancier holds iff:
ψ(γ,D) ≥ I − A + FC.
It can be checked that, as long as the conversion threshold is below the upper
bound of the cash ﬂow, ψ(γ,D) is increasing in γ. Again, this conforms to intu-
ition: the larger the conversion rate, the better off the bond–holders (provided the
10manager exerts effort). Relying on this monotonicity condition, the participation
constraint of the outside ﬁnancier is:
γ ≥ ψ
−1
γ (I − A + FC,D),
where ψ−1
γ denotes the inverse of ψ with respect to γ. That is, the ﬁnancier is will-
ing to fund the project with convertible debt only if he is promised a sufﬁciently
large conversion rate.
Note that in the above inequalities ψ−1
γ and ˆ ψ are evaluated for a certain value
of D. The project can be undertaken and funded by convertible debt if there exists
a value of D ∈ [0,T], such that the individual rationality condition of the manager
and the participation constraint of the outside ﬁnancier are consistent. As in the
cases of debt and equity, this is possible if and only if the cost of effort is not too
large, as stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 3 Investment can take place and be ﬁnanced with convertible debt if
and only the cost of effort of the manager is lower than the following threshold:
eC = MaxD[ ˆ ψ(ψ
−1
γ (I − A + FC,D),D)].
2.4 Financial choices
When the cost of effort is lower than the three thresholds characterized above, i.e.,
when:
e < Min[eC,eD,eE],
then the three forms of ﬁnancing are feasible. In this case, the entrepreneur simply
needs to pick the ﬁnancing tool generating the largest utility for him. To charac-
terize this choice, for simplicity, assume that the particpation constraint of the
outside investors is binding (we will subsequently stick to this assumption.) The
expected utility of the manager if he issues equity is:
UE = (Ef(R) + X − σd)(1 − τ) − (I − A) − e,
which is equal to the after tax proﬁt of the ﬁrm, minus the amount which must
be paid back to the outside ﬁnanciers to ensure that their participation constraint
holds, and minus the cost of effort. On the other hand, if the manager issues debt,
his expected utility is:
UD = (Ef(R)+X −d)−(I −A)−e−cEf((R +X −d)1(R < D −X +d))
11−τEf((R + X − k(D + d))1(R > σ(D + d) − X)),
which is equal to the expected cash–ﬂow, minus the amount to be promised to
the ﬁnanciers, the cost of effort, the expected bankruptcy cost, and the expected
tax cost. Similarly, with convertible bond ﬁnancing, the expected utility of the
manager is:










(R + X − k(D + d))f(R)dR],
reﬂectingagaintheexpectedcash–ﬂow, thecompensationoftheoutsideﬁnanciers,
thecostofeffort, theﬁnancialdistresscostsandthetaxes. Inthiscontext, theman-
ager will choose the ﬁnancing tool providing him with the largest expected utility.
This choice exactly reﬂects the trade–off theory, i.e., the manager selects the ﬁ-
nancing scheme minimizing the sum of ﬁnancial distress costs, taxes and issuing
costs. Indeed, when, for all three ﬁnancing schemes, incentive compatibility con-
ditions and participation constraints are consistent, agency issues do not constrain
ﬁnancial choices, and the Modigliani and Miller logic applies.
On the other hand, if only equity and convertible bonds are feasible, i.e., if:
eD < e < Min[eE,eC],
then the manager chooses equity if: UE > UC, and convertible bonds otherwise.
Similarly, if only debt and equity are feasible the manager chooses equity if and
only if: UE > UD, while if only convertible bonds and debt are feasible, the
manager chooses debt if and only if: UD > UC. Finally, if only one ﬁnancing tool
is feasible, it is trivially selected, while if no ﬁnancing tool is feasible, i.e., if:
e > Max[eE,eD,eC],
then the ﬁrm is credit rationed and investment cannot take place.
2.5 A simple parametrization
To explicitly compute the above characterized quantities in our econometric anal-
ysis, we rely on a simple parametrization for the distribution the cash ﬂows. First,
12we assume that the c.d.f of the cash ﬂow when the manager does not exert effort
(G) is equal to: F p, where F is the c.d.f of the cash ﬂow under effort. p ∈ [0,1]
quantiﬁes the consequences of managerial effort on output. Since F < 1, for
p ∈ [0,1], G > F, as required by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. The lower
p the more severe the consequences of shirking on output. Second, to simplify
computations, we assume F is uniform over [0,T]. Under these assumptions, we
computed the threshold values of the cost of effort and the managerial expected
utility for the different ﬁnancing schemes. The results are presented in Appendix
1.
3 Data
To confront this theoretical analysis to the data we consider 680 French ﬁrms
quoted on the Paris Bourse on December 31, 1996.13 To analyze their investment
and ﬁnancing behavior in 1996 we use as predetermined variables accounting in-
formation from 1995. To collect this information, as well as information on the
industries to which ﬁrms belong, we used data from a French ﬁnancial statements
analyst: DAFSA. Weobtained the entireinformation weneeded for379 ﬁrms. For
these ﬁrms we observe in 1995 the total assets, the book value debt, the tangible
assets, corporate income tax, interest expenses and depreciations. In our descrip-
tion of this data, as well as in our econometric analysis below, we will focus on
variables normalized by total assets. This facilitates comparability across ﬁrms.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1, both across all 379 ﬁrms and sorted
across four broadly deﬁned industries: manufacturing ﬁrms, services, high–tech,
and real estate and ﬁnancial ﬁrms.14 We chose to differentiate high–tech ﬁrms
from the other industrial ﬁrms because they are likely to exhibit different invest-
ment and ﬁnancing patterns. On average, across industries, total assets amounted
to 11.15 billion French Francs (i.e. approximately 2 billion dollars). The ratio
of debt to total assets was close to 50%, while the ratio of tangible assets to total
assets was approximately 23%. While the average total assets of manufacturing
13This excludes ﬁrms which listed in 1996 and ﬁrms which did not list. This limitation is a
loss, since some of these ﬁrms have issued (privately) equity, convertible debt or bank debt in that
period, and would have offered an interesting testing ground for our theory. Unfortunately, data
on these issues is not easily available.
14Slightly less than one half of the ﬁrms in the category “Real estate and fìnance” are real estate
investment funds, with very large tangible to total assets ratios. Investment funds, with very low
leverage ratio, represent a large fraction of the other half.
13ﬁrms were somewhat above the grand–mean, they were lower for the ﬁnancial and
real estate sector, and high–tech ﬁrms.
In this sample, in 1996, 16 ﬁrms issued equity, and 9 issued convertible bonds.
We identiﬁed as ﬁrms issuing debt those for which total debt on December 31,
1996, was more than 10 % higher than total debt on December 31, 1995.15 Using
this criterion, 75 ﬁrms issued debt that year.16 This left 279 ﬁrms in the sample
for which there was no outside ﬁnancing. Summary statistics on these ﬁnancial
choices are presented in Table 2. On average convertible bond issues amount to
1.3 billion French Francs (approximately .2 billion dollars), corresponding to 17.8
% of the total assets of the ﬁrms. Debt issues amounted on average to 1.6 billion
French Francs, corresponding to 24% of the total assets. Equity issues amounted
on average to .19 billion French Francs, corresponding to 20 % of the total assets.
Figure 1, Panel A, plots issue size as a fraction of total assets (in 1995) for the 16
ﬁrms in our sample which issued equity in 1996. The corresponding plot for ﬁrms
which raised debt is in Panel B.
The ratio of total debt to total assets was similar for ﬁrms issuing equity and
for ﬁrms issuing convertible bonds (around 57 %). This ratio was lower for ﬁrms
issuing debt (48%). Also the ratio of tangible assets to total assets is larger for
ﬁrms issuing debt (24.8 %) than for ﬁrms issuing equity (14.7 %) or convertible
bonds (16 %). This is consistent with the view that ﬁrms which are highly levered
or which have low tangible assets ratio are exposed to a larger ﬁnancial distress
risk.
4 Econometric model
4.1 Parameter and variables
We assume that the ﬁrms differ with respect to their cost of effort, their cost of
ﬁnancial distress, their ﬁnancing need, their effective tax rate (reﬂecting non–
debt tax shields), their interest rate, their debt initially in place, and the expected
cash ﬂow from their investment opportunity, denoted: ei,ci,Ii − Ai,τi,ki,di, and
Efi(R), respectively, where i is the index of the ﬁrm. Otherwise ﬁrms are simi-
lar. While the agents in the theoretical model (i.e., the manager and the outside
15This is similar to Dichev and Piotrovski, 1998.
16Note that corporate bond issues by non ﬁnancial ﬁrms are very rare in France, and most of
these debt issues corresponded to bank loans.
14investor) are assumed to know ei,ci,Ji,τi,ki,di,Xi, and Efi(R), the econometri-
cian does not observe these directly.
To conduct the econometric analysis, we assume that ci,τi,ki,di, and Efi(R)
are functions of observable, predetermined. Financial distress costs are likely to
be larger for ﬁrms with a large fraction of intangible assets. We assume there
exists two constants αC and βC such that:
ci = exp(−[αC + βCGi]),
where Gi is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets in 1995. For positive values
of αC and βC, this speciﬁcation ensures that while the cost of ﬁnancial distress
is always between 0 and 1, it is decreasing in the ratio of tangible assets to total
assets. Further we assume that the tax rate for ﬁrm i is:




where total assets as well as depreciation are observed in 1995. We also assume





where Si is interest expenses for ﬁrm i in 1995 and debt is its debt in 1995. Assets
in place are our normalizing variable and in the econometric analysis will be set










where 1(i ∈ s) is the indicator that ﬁrm i is in industry s.
Denote Ji = Ii − Ai the outside ﬁnancing need of ﬁrm i. Consistent with
the above normalizations, in the econometric analysis, we normalize the observed
amounts raised by ﬁrms by dividing them by the total assets of the issuing ﬁrms.
For those ﬁrms which do issue debt, convertible debt or equity, we observe the
(normalized) value of Ji. For the other ﬁrms, Ji is not directly observed. We
15assume all the outside ﬁnancing needs are independently drawn from the same
distribution with positive support and density and c.d.f. denoted n(.) and N(.)
respectively. In the econometric analysis we will use this identifying assumption
to back up estimates of the latent outside ﬁnancing needs of the ﬁrms who have
not raised funds.
We do not observe the costs of effort. We assume they are independent draws
of distributions with positive support with density and c.d.f. denoted mi(.) and
Mi(.) respectively. The distributions of the costs of efforts ei can vary across
individuals only as a function of the predetermined observed variables. The para-
metric forms we use in our maximum likelihood estimation for the distribution of
the cost of effort and the distribution of the outside ﬁnancing need are presented
in Appendix 2.
Denote θ the vector of deep parameters to be estimated. It includes: The
parameters of the distributions of J and e. The moral hazard parameter: p. The
parameters characterizing the ﬁnancial distress costs: αC,βC, the effective tax
rate: αT,βT, and the cash ﬂow from the project: ts,s = 1,2,3,4,.
4.2 Likelihood
Denote: ul = Ul − e,l = E,C,D. Note that ul does not depend on e. Denote IE
the set of ﬁrms which issued equity, ICD the set of ﬁrms which issued convertible
debt, ID the set of ﬁrms which issued debt, IR is the set of ﬁrms which did not
issue any claims. The likelihood of the observations is:
L = LELDLCLR,
where LE is the likelihood of the ﬁrms which issued equity:
LE = Πi∈IE{[M(min[eE,eC]) − M(eD)]
+1(uE − uC > 0)
+[M(min[eE,eD]) − M(eC)]




16while LC is the likelihood of the ﬁrms which issued convertible debt:
LC = Πi∈IC{[M(min[eE,eC]) − M(eD)]
+1(uC − uE > 0)
+[M(min[eC,eD]) − M(eE)]




LD is the likelihood of the ﬁrms which issued straight debt:
LD = Πi∈ID{[M(min[eD,eC]) − M(eE)]
+1(uD − uC > 0)
+[M(min[eD,eE]) − M(eC)]









where Jsup is the upper bound of the support of J.
To conduct the numerical maximization of the loglikelihood we used genetic
algorithms.17 We set the population size, i.e., the number of candidate parameter
values in one generation, to 50. We set the total number of trials to 8000. The
crossover rate (which characterizes the way in which the characteristics of the
individuals in the population are mixed from one iteration to the other) was set
to 0.6, while the mutation rate, i.e., the probability that each individual in one
generation is affected by a random mutation, was set to 0.1. The ranges of the
parameter values we considered while conducting the numerical optimization are
in Table 3.
17The package we used is GENESIS Version 5.0.
175 Econometric results
In this preliminary version of the paper, we report results obtained relying only on
the ﬁrms which issued equity or debt and on the ﬁrms which did not raise funds,
i.e., we have not yet included convertible debt issues. We will do so in a further
draft.
The estimates of the deep parameters of the model are in Table 4. They can
be interpreted in relation with the driving forces of our theoretical model: agency
costs, ﬁnancial distress costs, and taxes.
• Agency costs: The estimates are such that the fraction of the expected cash–







is equal to 43%. Hence, according to our estimates, managerial effort has
quite a large impact on proﬁts. Another way to quantify the agency cost is





Our estimates imply that this ratio is equal to 40.26%. Hence we ﬁnd rather
large agency costs.
• Financial distress: Our estimates imply that the average cost of ﬁnancial
distress c amounts to 41.2%. This is rather large. A recent paper by An-
drade and Kaplan (1998) offers estimates based on an in depth analysis of
LBO cases. Their estimate is of the order of magnitude of 20%. They note
that their sample of LBO’s is likely to include ﬁrms with lower than aver-
age ﬁnancial distress costs, and which consequentlly chose to increase their
leverage signiﬁcantly. Our estimates also imply that, for the 75 ﬁrms in or
sample which raised debt the probability of ﬁnancial distress after the issue:
Pr(R < D + d − X)
is approximately equal to 2.1%.
• Effective tax rates: Our estimates imply that the effective tax rate, prevail-
ing after ﬁrms have used all ther non debt tax shields, is not signiﬁcantly
18different from 0. This suggests rejecting the theory of leverage based on tax
shields.
A graphic illustration of our results is presented in Figure 2. Panel A plots,
for all the ﬁrms which raised funds in our sample, the estimated values of their
threshold costs of effort associated with debt (eD) and with equity (eE), against the
outside ﬁnancing need (J) of these ﬁrms. This ﬁgure illustrates that the threshold
cost of effort is larger for debt than for equity. This is because debt provides
stronger incentives to exert effort than equity does. In spite of this, equity is
sometimes chosen by the manager, when their cost of effort is sufﬁciently low, to
avoid ﬁnancial distress costs. Panel B presents the cumulative density function of
the cost of effort: M(e), for our estimate of λJ and taking as upper bound of e the
value above which effort ceases to be optimal:







Finaly, Panel C presents the c.d.f of the (normalized) outside ﬁnancing need:
N(J).
What is the robustness of our results ? The estimate of agency costs seems to
be rather robust. Figure 3 plots the loglikelihood of the observations, keeping all
parameters in θ constant, except p, which varies from 0 to 1. The ﬁgure shows that
the loglikelihood is well behaved and exhibits a clear extremum around p = .396.
In a earlier draft of this paper (Biais, Bisière and Décamps, 1998), relying on
a somewhat different theoretical model and data–set, we had obtained estimates
of the agency costs with the same order of magnitude.18 Also, as the numerical
maximization algorithm we used progressed, it kept generating estimates of p
close to .4.
Our ﬁnding that effective tax rates are not signiﬁcantly different from 0 is
also a pervasive feature of the outputs generated by our numerical maximization
procedure at its different steps.
On the other hand, there seems to be some instability in our estimates of the
ﬁnancial distress costs. In the above mentioned previous version of this paper
(Biais, Bisière and Décamps, 1998) we had obtained estimates of the order of
magnitude of 20%, which is quite lower than our present estimate. In addition, as
the numerical maximization algorithm we used to generate the present estimate
18The previous draft relied on a more stylized theoretical model, which did not allow for assets
in place, prior leverage, or taxes. Also it used a coarser data set. In particular the econometric
analysis did not integrate information about leverage, industry, taxes, etc...
19progressed, and before it reached the optimum reported in Table 4, it sometimes
generated values such that the ﬁnancial distress costs were much above or below
40%.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a structural econometrics analysis of an agency theoretic
model of ﬁnancing choices and estimates it on a data set of 370 French ﬁrms
in 1996. We ﬁnd that agency costs and costs of ﬁnancial distress are rather large,
while the search for tax shields does not seem to inﬂuence ﬁnancial choices.
By offering estimates of optimal ﬁnancing choices and agency costs, we take
a ﬁrst step towards using asymmetric information theory to generate quantita-
tive rather than simply qualitative insights into corporate ﬁnance decision making.
This speaks to the issue raised by Leland (1998) in his presidential address: “The
theories fail to offer quantitative advice as to the amount of debt a ﬁrm should
issue in different environments.”19 Furthermore, our structural econometric ap-
proach of the joint investment and ﬁnancing decision provides a bridge between
the empirical works studying the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on investment (in
which ﬁnancial structure variables are on the right–hand–side of the regression,
see e.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), and those analyzing the determinants
of ﬁnancial structure (in which ﬁnancial decisions are on the left–hand–side, see
e.g., Barclay, Smith and Watts, 1995).
19Obviously, Leland’s (1998) own answer predates ours. Still, the trade–off underlined in the
theoretical analysis of Leland (1998), between the tax beneﬁts of debt and its risk–shfting agency
costs, differs from the trade–off studied in the present paper. Furthermore, while Leland (1998)
relies on numerical simulations to implement his analysis, we offer a structural econometrics ap-
proach.
20Appendix 1:Cost of effort threshold and managerial utility in our simple
parametrization of the distribution of the cash–ﬂow.
Under our simple parametrization, after tedious but straightforward computa-
tions, we obtain that the functions ˆ ϕ, ϕ, ψ and ˆ ψ characterizing incentive compat-
ibility and individual rationality for debt and convertible bonds are as follows:






































































while the effort thresholds are:
eE(J) =
(1 − τ)(T



































eC(J) = MaxD[ ˆ ψ(D,ψ
−1
γ (D,J + FC))],
where:
ψ−1





J + FC − ϕ(D)
[
q
J + FC − ϕ(D) +
q
J + FC − ϕ(D) − 2D
T (σd − X − T)].
Furthermore, in this parametrization, managerial expected utility under the



























+ XT − k(ϕ































γ (D,J + FC)(1 − τ)
− σ)]],
s.t.,
e < ˆ ψ(D,ψ
−1
γ (D,J + FC)).
22Appendix 2: Parametrization of the distributions of the cost of effort and the
outside ﬁnancing need.
Distribution of the outside ﬁnancing need:
We assume that the support of the distribution of Ji is: [0,1].We assume that
the density of Ji over this interval is:
n(Ji) = kJ exp(λJJi).





Note that n(Ji) is increasing in Ji iff λJ > 0.
Distribution of the cost of effort:
Positive NPV for all projects (provided effort is exerted) implies:
Ti
2 −ei > Ii,
that is: ei <
Ti
2 − Ii. Since ∀i,Ji < Ii, this implies that: ei <
Ti
2 − Ji, which we
















We assume that the density of ei over this interval is:
m(ei) = ki,e exp(λeei).










Note that m(ei) is increasing in ei iff λe > 0.
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25Table 1:
Summary statistics on size, leverage and tangible assets in 1995 for the 379
ﬁrms in our data set. Amounts are in millions of French Francs.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
All ﬁrms
Total assets 379 11154.52 35074.04 15.23700 290599.00
debt/assets 379 0.5196524 0.2073228 0.00232 0.965383
tangible/assets 379 0.2263907 0.1800641 0.000564 0.9854510
Finance and real estate
Total assets 36 3257.99 7010.80 15.237 38090.20
debt/assets 36 0.277872 0.3168160 0.00232 0.965383
tangible/assets 36 0.3585852 0.3436250 0.00056 0.90918
manufacturing
total assets 215 14537.79 40760.32 50.7260 255675
debt/assets 215 0.53224 0.18115 0.0068 0.965
tangible/assets 215 0.217 0.1159 0.0011 0.666
services
total assets 96 8249.70 31658.07 23.22 290599
debt/assets 96 0.56168 0.1595 0.093 0.87433
tangible/assets 96 0.239 0.204 0.005 0.985
High tech
total assets 33 6176.79 15242.77 49.8820 60186.00
debt/assets 33 0.5790985 0.168764 0.15355 0.8416915
tangible/assets 33 0.1023383 0.0668731 0.017 0.2943401
26Table 2:
Summary statistics on outside ﬁnancing for the 379 ﬁrms in our sample
(amounts are in millions of French Francs)
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Total assets 379 11154.52 35074.04 15.23700 290599.00
debt/assets 379 0.5196524 0.2073228 0.00232 0.965383
tangible/assets 379 0.2263907 0.1800641 0.000564 0.9854510
no issue
total assets 279 10934.49 33062.53 31.4130 255675.00
debt/assets 279 0.5249441 0.2132213 0.0023 0.965383
tangible/assets 279 0.2236136 0.1676078 0.000684 0.8921527
equity issue
issue size 16 192.6847500 221.390 9.7550 31.7130
total assets 16 2476.56 4417.04 89.0100 14244.70
debt/assets 16 0.5793020 0.13512 0.3632 0.7688
issue/assets 16 0.2023289 0.1940427 0.0425 0.80209
tangible/assets 16 0.1469748 0.1137562 0.0127 0.3668
convertible issue
issue size 9 1311.80 1510.47 36.69 4221.00
total assets 9 33975.50 75267.33 207.115 231812.00
debt/assets 9 0.5772443 0.2178464 0.2456 0.8324885
issue/assets 9 0.1783167 0.1818973 0.0148 0.4549453
tangible/assets 9 0.1605648 0.1477376 0.0005 0.3914218
debt issue
isssue size 75 1630.52 4859.76 3.6230 32985.00
total assets 75 11088.77 38509.02 15.2370 290599.00
debt/assets 75 0.4802608 0.1924821 0.0257 0.8457512
issue/assets 75 0.2479311 0.1904441 0.1006 0.9535835
tangible/asssets 75 0.2615993 0.2279999 0.0048 0.9854510
27Table 3:




























29Figure 1, Panel A:
Issue size, as a fraction of total assets in 1995, for the 16 ﬁrms in our sample
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Figure 1, Panel B:
Issue size, as a fraction of total assets in 1995, for the 75 ﬁrms in our sample
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30Figure 2, Panel A:
Threshold cost of effort for debt (eD, depicted by empty circles) and equity
(eE, depicted by solid circles), as a function of outside ﬁnancing need (J), for
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Figure 2, Panel B:
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31Figure 2, Panel C:











Loglikelihood of the data, keeping all the parameters ﬁxed at their optimal
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